Governing with Judges

This volume elaborates a theory of constitutional politics, the process through which the discursive practices and techniques of constitutional adjudication come to structure the work of governments, parliaments, judges, and administrators. Focusing on the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the European Union, the book examines the sources and consequences of the pan-European movement to confer constitutional review authority on a new governmental institution, the constitutional court. Detailed case studies illustrate how and to what extent legislative processes have been placed under the influence of constitutional judges. In a growing number of policy domains, these judges function as powerful, adjunct legislators. As constitutional courts have consolidated their position as authoritative interpreters of the constitutional law, and especially of human rights provisions, the work of the judiciary, too, has gradually been constitutionalised. Today, ordinary judges seek to detect violations of the constitution in their application of the various codes, and to rewrite statutes that they deem unconstitutional Alec Stone Sweet argues that constitutional adjudication construct

The author weaves a fascinating and intricate causal account ... this is a clearly written and painstakingly researched book. In addition to its substantive findings, it is also of methodological interest ... essential reading for any understanding of contemporary European democracy., With this book it becomes possible for the first time to teach a constitutional law course that fits comfortably into both the comparative law and comparative politics curricula. It displays the blend of theoretical sophistication and knowledge of legal realities that we have a right to expect of comparative law and politics scholarship.

Alec Stone Sweet is Official Fellow in Politics, Chair in Comparative Government, Nuffield College, Oxford University.