Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making

The enactive approach replaces the classical computer metaphor of mind with emphasis on embodiment and social interaction as the sources of our goals and concerns. Researchers from a range of disciplines unite to address the challenge of how to account for the more uniquely human aspects of cognition, including the abstract and the nonsensical.

“It provides an important contribution to the enactive project of clarifying what cognition viewed as sense-making consist of. The book’s originality lies in its unusual angle on the topic, namely by focussing on forms of sense-making … . It offers plenty of interdisciplinary insight and both theoretical and empirical support to the idea that nonsense, far from being a marginal side-effect or the opposite of cognition, is a window into the very workings of the embodied mind.” (Miriam Kyselo, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 18, 2019)

Michael Beaton, University of the Basque Country, Spain Michel Bitbol, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France Anthony Chemero, University of Cincinnati, USA Elena Clare Cuffari, University of the Basque Country, Spain Natalie Depraz, University of Rouen (ERIAC), France Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, the Basque Science Foundation, Spain Daria Dibitonto, Amedeo Avogadro University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy Dobromir Dotov, Université Montpellier-1, France Juan C. González, Morelos State University (UAEM), Mexico David A. Leavens, University of Sussex, UK Michele Merritt, Arkansas State University, USA Wilson Shearin, University of Miami, USA William Michael Short, University of Texas, San Antonio, USA John Stewart, Technological University of Compiègne, France Alistair Welchman, University of Texas, San Antonio, USA