Limits of Free Will

The Limits of Free Will contains a selection of papers concerning free will and moral responsibility. The problems arising in this field of philosophy, which are deeply rooted in the history of the subject, are also intimately related to a wide range of other fields, such as law and criminology, moral psychology, theology, and, more recently, neuroscience. The papers included in this collection were written and first published over a period of three decades,although most have appeared in the past decade or so. During this period this area of philosophy has been particularly active and it continues to attract a great deal of interest and attention. Among the topics covered, as they relate to these problems, are the challenge of skepticism; moral sentiment andmoral capacity; necessity and the metaphysics of causation; practical reason; free will and art; fatalism and the limits of agency; moral luck, and our metaphysical attitudes of optimism and pessimism. Some of the papers in this collection are primarily critical in character, presenting critiques and commentary on major works or contributions in the contemporary scene. Others are mainly constructive, aiming to develop and articulate a distinctive account of compatibilism. The general theory advanced, which is described as a form of "critical compatibilism", rejects any form of unqualified or radical skepticism but also insists that a plausible compatibilism has significant and substantiveimplications about the limits of agency and argues that this licenses a metaphysical attitude of (modest) pessimism on this topic. Finally, each paper in this collection is self-standing and can be read in isolation from the others. There is, nevertheless, a core set of themes and issues that unite andlink them all together. The collection is arranged and organized in a format that enables the reader to appreciate and recognize these links and the core themes that unite them.

It was both a pleasure and a revelation to revisit these articles together as a group, and to see what a powerful and unified vision of the nature of human freedom and responsibility Russell has put forward over these many years. What comes out most clearly after sustained engagement with Russell's work is his deep humanity and his clear-eyed appreciation of what he takes to be our basic human predicament: namely, that we must see ourselves as free and morally responsible agents, even as we recognize the myriad ways in which luck and fate play an ineliminable role in shaping the moral quality of our lives., The Limits of Free Will is a marvelous collection of papers by Paul Russell. It is full of insightful and illuminating critiques, but it also provides readers with an interesting and distinctive position on free will and moral responsibility ... Russell's unique blend of pessimism and optimism is highly compelling and his arguments beautifully crafted, with great sensitivity to our deepest human concerns. The volume is enormously enlightening and will reward its readers many times over., The free will debate is notoriously deadlocked, and Russell's work thoughtfully opens up new areas of philosophical exploration. But more importantly, Russell's philosophical facing-up to our limits as natural beings embodies intellectual humility and humanity in equal measure. As a young scholar, I am especially grateful to have encountered his work., What stands out especially about this collection is the way in which Russell marries matters of fate and luck with our conception of ourselves as agents more broadly beyond the moral realm ... The merits of this collection go well beyond being a valuable compendium of critical assessment of contemporary optimism and skepticism about moral responsibility. Russell harnesses decades of reflection on moral responsibility to construct a distinctive yet measured compatibilist alternative, one that acknowledges the limits of human control while upholding the dignity of our moral life., These are all uniformly excellent papers, beautifully written and offering a unique and important perspective on the topics of free will and moral responsibility.

Paul Russell is Professor in Philosophy at the University of British Columbia and Lund University. His publications include Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1995); The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (Oxford University Press, 2008); and editor of The Philosophy of Free Will (Oxford University, 2013).