Spandrels of Truth

Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which 'is true' is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. This device, when introduced into the language, brings about truth-theoretic paradoxes (particularly, the notorious Liar and Curry paradoxes). The options for dealing with the paradoxes while preserving the full transparency of 'true' are limited. In Spandrels of Truth, Beall conciselypresents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.

The account offered is unique among recent treatments of the paradoxes for saving a perfectly transparent truth predicate, whereby x and x is true are fully intersubstitutable. This feature, and its stabilisation within a bivalent framework, give the book considerable specialist interest. but the informality of the treatment, achieved without significant compromise of rigour, provides in addition for a remarkably effective and readable introduction to the contemporary debate about the paradoxes., ...although paradoxes such as the Liar have provided the main motivation for dialetheism, it is remarkable that previous dialetheic theories do not preserve the minimalist view of truth. Spandrels of Truth is the first dialetheic attempt to do so, and it addresses the main problems (e.g. the conditional) that a dialetheic minimalist must face. It is a very welcome addition to the literature., In this excellent book, Beall defends this combination of dialethism and transparency, drawing out its consequences with clarity and verve. The book also serves as an introduction to transparent theories of truth more generally, by including a valuable discussion of the leading rival: Field's transparent but non-dialethic account. It adds up to an attractive package: if I were a dialethist, I'd be Beall's kind of dialethist!, JC Beall concisely presents and defends a simple, modest, dialetheic approach to truth and semantic paradoxes... it does a great job in presenting and defending its ideas... an excellent and readable introduction to the contemporary technical discussions about truth and semantic paradoxes.

Jc Beall is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, a member of the UConn Group in Logic, and an Associate Fellow of Arché, the AHRC Research Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics, and Epistemology. Though having wide philosophical interests, Beall has published mainly in philosophical logic and the philosophy of logic.