This work argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting "modest identity theory", while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.
Format:
CONTRIBUTORS: Julian Dodd
EAN: 9780333682265
COUNTRY: United Kingdom
PAGES:
WEIGHT: 425 g
HEIGHT: 216 cm
PUBLISHED BY: Palgrave Macmillan
DATE PUBLISHED: 2000-06-20
CITY:
GENRE: PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology, PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body
WIDTH: 140 cm
SPINE:
Book Themes:
Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
'Dodd's book presents a clear, thorough account of work on identity theories of truth...Dodd's clear, thorough exposition of the issues, and his engagement with minimalism, rewards close study.' - Michael Hay, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 'Exceptionally clearly argued...this is an excellent book...Dodd has thought-provoking things to say about the work of Ramsay, Tarski, Blackburn, Prior, Vendler, Rundle, and Salmon...The book is so well written that it could serve as a partisan introduction to truth for postgraduates and advanced undergraduates. Indeed, it could serve as a model of how to write good, clear philosophical prose. Overall, the book can profitably be read by anyone interested in the philosophy of truth.' - Alexander Miller, Mind
JULIAN DODD lectures in philosophy at the University of Manchester, UK. His previous publications include Musical Works: An Essay in Ontology (OUP, 2007) and, with Helen Beebee, Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate (OUP, 2005).
