Russian 'Hybrid Warfare' and the Annexation of Crimea

Western academics, politicians, and military leaders alike have labelled Russia’s actions in Crimea and its follow-on operations in Eastern Ukraine as a new form of “Hybrid Warfare.” In this book, Kent DeBenedictis argues that, despite these claims, the 2014 Crimean operation is more accurately to be seen as the Russian Federation’s modern application of historic Soviet political warfare practices—the overt and covert informational, political, and military tools used to influence the actions of foreign governments and foreign populations. DeBenedictis links the use of Soviet practices, such as the use of propaganda, disinformation, front organizations, and forged political processes, in the Crimea in 2014 to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (the “Prague Spring”) and the earliest stages of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Through an in-depth case study analysis of these conflicts, featuring original interviews, government documents and Russian and Ukrainian sources, this book demonstrates that the operation, which inspired discussions about Russian “Hybrid Warfare,” is in fact the modern adaptation of Soviet political warfare tools and not the invention of a new type of warfare.

A very timely, relevant, and important book – with a compelling explanation of the true nature of Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare,’ including eye-opening details of the lengths Russia went to orchestrate the 2014 annexation of Crimea, as well as illuminating examinations of earlier actions that offer insights, as well. DeBenedictis establishes convincingly that Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ is best understood as the modern application of traditional Soviet political warfare practices, such as active measures, maskirovka, and disinformation – and such understanding is critical in the contemporary era of renewed great power rivalries., A brilliant analysis of modern war by a young, yet seasoned, Army leader. Kent DeBenedictis thoughtfully dissects the ‘hybrid warfare’ conducted by the Russians in Ukraine and shows that while it is explosively effective, it is not new to Russian strategy, or to warfare in general. Success, even survival, may depend on our ability to both understand, and to master it., This is a timely and highly relevant analysis that deserves careful consideration by all those who intend to commentate on the threat, Why does the West keep getting surprised by Russia? Partly, it is because we do not use the past properly to understand the future, and this impressively researched study precisely addresses that, placing the 2014 seizure of Crimea in the context of Moscow's past adventures, an exercise of value to scholars and policy-makers alike., This excellent new book makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of Russian political warfare, challenging existing assumptions and prevailing narratives. Extensively researched, it reveals continuities between historical Soviet political warfare practices and Russia’s 2014 intervention in Crimea.

Kent DeBenedictis holds a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London, UK. He is an Active Duty Major in the U.S. Army, currently on assignment in Germany. He was awarded the General Wayne A. Downing Scholarship, funded through the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, in order to earn his PhD.