Nietzschean Metaethics

This book develops a novel interpretation of the late nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche as holding a distinct and original metaethical position (a theory about our practice of ethics). It is, what might be called, a human-centered metaethics. A central achievement of A Nietzschean Metaethics is to bring Nietzsche into a conversation with the analytic metaethical tradition. To do so, David Emmanuel Rowe interprets Nietzsche’s use of such concepts as the notorious “will to power”; his ideal agent, the superman or Übermensch; nihilism; the eternal recurrence; Perspectivism; and Being and Becoming. The result is a view of Nietzsche as a radical moral error theorist, which is to say he defends the view that all statements that appeal to some value for their truth are false. This theory is radical because Nietzsche argues that insofar as language requires certain concepts for its truth it is in error, in virtue of an appeal to some value. Rowe also offers a view where the increase in one’s power is a standard by which one can make sense of Nietzsche’s so-called re-evaluation of all values. By means of this resolution, Nietzsche criticizes some contemporary themes in metaethics, such as particular views about moral motivation, reasons, moral error theory, and agency.

Rowe's rich and comprehensive discussions of Nietzschean metaethics will be valuable for anyone interested in Nietzsche's normative thought. Rowe argues that we should read Nietzsche as an error theorist about moral values who nonetheless offers a positive normative standard, namely power; and this positive standard is supported by a constitutivist argument. Along the way, Rowe offers intriguing critiques of some of the most prominent recent discussions of Nietzsche's metaethics; contends that we can develop Nietzschean arguments against motivational judgment internalism by considering the opacity of human action; and shows how Nietzsche's error theory is compatible with the creation of new evaluative perspectives.--Paul Katsafanas, Boston University, Nietzsche says one should philosophise with a hammer. In this book, David Rowe does just that, dismantling some central platforms of contemporary meta-ethics, especially its rationalism, but also constructing his own Nietzschean-inspired view that avoids those errors.--Jack Reynolds, Professor of Philosophy at Deakin University, Melbourne

David Emmanuel Rowe is sessional lecturer/tutor at Deakin and Monash universities.