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This is an examination of the intemational diplomacy and decision-making that accompanied the collapse of Yugoslavia and its descent into war and chaos. Public opinion has consistently favoured greater Western determination to counter Serbian and Croatian aggression by intervening or arming the Bosnian government, to forge a peace that preserves Bosnia's independence, and to improve the flow of aid to beleaguered cities. However, differences of opinion, between the US and Europe and within the EC itself, have hampered the search for an effective response. James Cow has followed the war on a day-to-day basis, both as an adviser to government and commentator in the Guardian and The Times. Here he assesses the involvement of the UN, the EC and the CSCE; the peacekeeping efforts of UNPROFOR, NATO and the WEU; and the key roles of the US, Germany, France and Britain in shape policy. He concludes that the bad timing, inappropriateness and incoherence of international policies - all linked to the crucial question of political will over the use of force - explain the failure to act decisively and indicate a wider breakdown of political consensus in the Western alliance.
This is an examination of the intemational diplomacy and decision-making that accompanied the collapse of Yugoslavia and its descent into war and chaos. Public opinion has consistently favoured greater Western determination to counter Serbian and Croatian aggression by intervening or arming the Bosnian government, to forge a peace that preserves Bosnia's independence, and to improve the flow of aid to beleaguered cities. However, differences of opinion, between the US and Europe and within the EC itself, have hampered the search for an effective response. James Cow has followed the war on a day-to-day basis, both as an adviser to government and commentator in the Guardian and The Times. Here he assesses the involvement of the UN, the EC and the CSCE; the peacekeeping efforts of UNPROFOR, NATO and the WEU; and the key roles of the US, Germany, France and Britain in shape policy. He concludes that the bad timing, inappropriateness and incoherence of international policies - all linked to the crucial question of political will over the use of force - explain the failure to act decisively and indicate a wider breakdown of political consensus in the Western alliance.
